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NOTE

WE THE PEOPLE OR WE THE LEGISLATURE?:
THE STOCK ACT'S COMPROMISE BETWEEN
POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED ACCOUNTABILITY
AND KEEPING CONGRESS ABOVE THE LAW

I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 24, 2012, President Barack Obama presented his annual
State of the Union Address ("Address") to Congress.' For the large
majority of the Address, the President appeared to be speaking to the
American people as a whole. Toward the end of the Address, however,
he spoke to the members of Congress directly with regard to the seeming
disconnect between politicians and the rest of the country, specifically
concerning their alleged trading behavior in financial markets. He
stated: "Send me a bill that bans insider trading by members of
Congress; I will sign it tomorrow.",4 That statement was met with great
applause.5 Shortly thereafter, Congress appeared to have taken the
President's suggestion as a personal challenge.6 Two days after the
Address was given, a measure relating to this very topic was addressed
in the Senate. 7 Members of Congress were lining up to give their8
approval of the bill before they even knew the details of its provisions.
1. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 12/0 1/24/remarks-president-state-union-address.
2. See id. (telling anecdotes, emphasizing issues that were popular among the people, and
using inclusive words and phrases).

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. 5111 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Kirsten
Gillibrand) ("President Obama said in his State of the Union Address, send this bill and he will sign
it right away. We should not delay. It is time to act and take a step right now to begin restoring the
trust that is broken in Congress.").
7. See id.at S110 (describing the Senate version of the STOCK Act that was introduced that
day).
8.

Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Look to Rein in Their Investing, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Nov. 28,
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Ten short weeks after the Address was given, President Obama signed
the Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 ("STOCK
Act" or "Act") 9 into law.' 0
President Obama is not the first government official to be
concerned about insider trading by members of Congress.l In fact, the
issues of congressional corruption and conflicts of interest have a
longstanding history of contention and dispute. 12 The potential problem
was brought to light as early as 1968, when journalists Drew Pearson
and Jack Anderson published a book that shed light upon potential
corruption within the halls of Congress. 13 The book highlighted the
numerous ways in which members of Congress have used their power
and influence to financially benefit, in a personal capacity, from the
information that crossed their desks daily.14 Concern over this issue has
resurfaced with a vengeance in the wake of the worst economic crisis
since the Great Depression. 15 Congress has sought to distance itself as
much as possible from
Wall Street and the other groups credited for
16
causing the recession.
Numerous individuals from all sides of the political and ideological
spectrum have reported that members of Congress often use their
privileged knowledge to reap large personal rewards in financial
markets. 17 There is little debate that congressional trading is

2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/lawmakers-look-to-rein-intrading.
9. Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291.
10.

Id.

11.
12.

See Hulse, supra note 8.
See id.
DREW PEARSON & JACK ANDERSON, THE CASE AGAINST CONGRESS: A COMPELLING

13.
INDICTMENT OF CORRUPTION ON CAPITOL HILL 184 (1968).
14. Id.

15. See Hulse, supra note 8 (drawing the connection between a renewed interest in regulating
legislators' trading behavior and an overall negative national economic climate).
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., PETER SCHWEIZER, THROW THEM ALL OUT: How POLITICIANS AND THEIR
FRIENDS GET RICH OFF INSIDER STOCK Tips, LAND DEALS, AND CRONYISM THAT WOULD SEND

THE REST OF US TO PRISON 32 (2011) (tracing legislators' increasing wealth in office to certain
investments they make in industries they influence); Daniel Indiviglio & Jeffrey Goldfarb, A
CongressionalConflict ofInterest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at B2 (noting that House Minority
Leader Nancy Pelosi's financial interests and legislative influences hover around the same
industries); Jane J. Kim, US. Senators' Stock Picks Outperform the Pros', WALL ST. J., Oct. 26,
2004, at D2 (observing that senators appear to know exactly when to sell their stock to make
profits); 60 Minutes: Insiders, TASER, Freeman Hrabowski (CBS television broadcast Nov. 13,
2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7388144n (highlighting that
legislators have daily access to material non-public information and that their personal wealth has
grown exponentially while in office).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss1/20

2

Austin: We the People or We the Legislature? The STOCK Act's Compromise B

2013]

THE STOCK ACTS'S COMPROMISE

undesirable.'" Most scholars agree that congressional trading should be
regulated so as to eliminate a skewed incentive structure that encourages
legislators to distort market efficiency for their own personal benefit.' 9
For decades, scholars have debated whether existing insider trading
law 2 ° extends to forbid members of Congress from trading on
information they learn in the course of fulfilling their legislative duties.2 '
Because the primary body of insider trading law is judge-made, and thus
only develops piecemeal as new cases are brought before the court, the
issue had never been completely resolved.22 Although several members
of Congress have been called into question for their trading decisions
(by the public, the media, and government ethics committees),23 the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") has
never attempted to 24bring formal insider trading charges against a
member of Congress.

18. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 299300 (2011) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway] (discussing the numerous reasons why
insider trading, as a category of trading behavior, is discouraged and made illegal).
19. See id
20. Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: O'Hagan Resolves "Insider" Trading's Most Vexing
Problems, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1998). It is important to note that there is no unified body of
insider trading law. Id The law that exists has been created piecemeal by the courts as cases come
before it. Id.

21. See, e.g., Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading in Congress: The Need for
Regulation, 9 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 199, 217 (2009) (arguing that a lack of a concrete duty owed by
legislators makes it unclear as to whether insider trading regulations apply to members of
Congress); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle:A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1982) (concluding that government officials trading falls
into the scope of the classical theory of insider trading); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading,
Congressional Officials, and Duties ofEntrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1154 (2011) [hereinafter
Nagy, CongressionalOfficials] (determining that the misappropriation theory of insider trading is
broad enough to include legislators' trading behavior); Bud W. Jerke, Comment, Cashing in on
Capitol Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of Political Intelligencefor Profit, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1451, 1485, 1487-88 (2010) (arguing that any justification for drawing legislators' trading into the
insider trading framework extends the doctrine far beyond its intended means); see also Jonathan R.
Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant Companions or Occasional
Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 104-08 (2009) (reviewing the arguments for and against the
applicability of existing insider trading laws to members of Congress).
22. Nagy, Congressional Officials, supra note 21, at 1110, 1137 (acknowledging that
government officials, the media, and securities law scholars all have varying views as to the
applicability of insider trading law to legislators because there is no concrete answer).
23. See, e.g., Scott Higham & Dan Keating, House Panel Chair Probed, WASH. POST, Feb.
10, 2012, at Al (chronicling the insider trading investigation against Representative Spencer Bachus
for trading securities in the industries regulated by the House Committee he chairs); Indivglio &
Goldfarb, supra note 17, at B2 (highlighting Nancy Pelosi's trading activities in industries she
regulates).
24. Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate to Take Up Bill to Ban Insider Trading by Lawmakers, N.Y.
TIMES CAUCUS (Jan. 26, 2012, 7:54 PM), http://www.thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/
senate-to-take-up-bill-to-ban-insider-trading-by-lawmakers/?pagewanted=print.
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The STOCK Act purports "[t]o prohibit Members of Congress and
employees of Congress from using nonpublic information derived from
their official positions for personal benefit, and for other purposes. ' 2 5
The Act clearly expresses that members of Congress have a duty to the
American people not to trade on this information, and that members are
subject to insider trading prohibitions.2 6 However, the Act creates
different standards, requirements, and penalties for members of
Congress than those that exist for corporate insiders under insider
trading law.27
This Note will argue that, although federal legislation is
unquestionably necessary to clarify the law's position on insider trading
by members of Congress and to provide guidance as to penalties that are
appropriate for legislators that violate the prohibitions, the STOCK Act
as passed is nowhere near sufficient to combat the growing problem.28
The Act not only fails to create sufficiently strict standards with regard
to the areas that it attempts to regulate, but it also provides far too many
loopholes and completely fails to regulate several of the leading causes
of insider trading.2 9 Additionally, the specific wording of the final
version of the Act has created additional problems that must be
overcome in the future for the Act's purpose to be properly effectuated.30
Part II will trace the evolution of insider trading regulations from
their earliest developments to their state at the time of the Act's
passage.3' It will then address the reasons why legislators' trading
behavior is unfavorable and should be regulated, and examine the
financial reporting requirements already in place for members of
Congress prior to the passage of the STOCK Act.32 Finally, this Part will
examine certain provisions of the STOCK Act in depth, with a particular
focus on those that prohibit insider trading, require individual
transactions to be reported, alter financial disclosure requirements, and
govern initial public offering ("IPO")allocations.33

25. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat.
291, 291. The Act also places restrictions on the trading behavior of legislative branch employees as
well as members and employees of the executive and judicial branches. Id. § 9(a). However, an
analysis of these provisions is outside the scope of this Note.
26. See id.
§ 4(a)-(b).
27. Compare id. § 4(b), with United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997)
(detailing current insider trading law as applied to corporate insiders).
28. See infra Part I.A.

29. See infra Part IIB.
30. See infra Part l.
31. See infra Part I.
32. See infra Part H.
33. See infra Part I.
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Part III will evaluate the STOCK Act's overall effectiveness, both
with regard to the extent to which it altered existing law and the
additional problems it created in enforcing insider trading prohibitions
against members of Congress. 34 This Note will argue that the Act added
very little substance to the existing body of law, but created several new
problems that will present additional hurdles in effectively prohibiting
members of Congress from trading on insider information. 35 This
logically leads to the conclusion that the Act is ineffective as passed
because it caused many more problems than it fixed, and as a result, its
stated purpose will be very difficult to achieve.36
Part IV will suggest several amendments to the STOCK Act that
will fix the previously mentioned problems and more effectively carry
out its stated purpose.37 In particular, it will argue that the standards and
requirements set forth for congressional insider trading should be
identical to the standards and requirements imposed on corporate
insiders. 38 Additionally, it will argue that political intelligence,
Congress's primary method of tipping as a pay-off device, should be
strictly regulated in a similar fashion to the way in which lobbying is
currently regulated.39
II.

INSIDER TRADING AND THE

STOCK ACT

In order to understand the overall effectiveness of the STOCK Act,
one must understand the historical and political context in which it came
to be.4 ° Part II, Subpart A examines the historical development of insider
trading law, with a focus on the three theories of liability currently in
force. 4' Subpart B describes the prevalence of insider trading behavior
currently exhibited on Capitol Hill and demonstrates why this behavior
must be regulated.42 Subpart C details the financial disclosure
requirements in place for legislators at the time that the STOCK Act was
passed. 43 Finally, Subpart D examines certain specific provisions of the
STOCK Act and analyzes the extent to which these provisions alter
preexisting law. 44
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See infra Part 1II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part ll.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part lI.A (explaining why there are so many holes in insider trading regulation).
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part ll.B.
See infra Part lI.C.
See infra Part ll.D.
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The Development of Insider Trading Law

Insider trading prohibitions of any type are a uniquely American
development.4 5 The British, from whom Americans largely borrowed
their laws, made no attempt to prohibit insider trading in the 17th and
18th centuries.46 British corporate insiders actively traded on the basis of
their private information, including in foreign markets trading British
securities.47 Even though insider trading was only formally recognized in
the United States beginning in the 1960s, 48 the behavior was primarily
unregulated in most other countries around the world until the 1980s. 49 It
was not until 1989, when the European Community Directive
Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading went into effect, that any
widely applicable regulation of insider trading was passed outside of the
United States.50
There are numerous reasons supporting the contention that insider
trading should not be prohibited. 5 1 The primary argument put forth,
especially as applied to corporate insiders, is that allowing officers to
trade in their own company's stock incentivizes their performance
because they will personally benefit only when the company performs
well. 2 This argument is the most common one advanced for leaving this
area unregulated. 53 Other arguments put forth include: that insider
trading regulations attempt to turn many shades of gray into black and
white; that regulation inhibits the ability of securities analysts to
thoroughly research companies in order to fully do their jobs; and that
insider trading is a victimless crime, and thus enforcing it is a waste of
valuable resources.54
45. See Thomas C. Newkirk & Melissa A. Robertson, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Insider
Trading - A U.S. Perspective (Sept. 19, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1998/spch221 .htm.
46. See Peter Koudijs, 'Those Who Know Most': Insider Trading in 18th Century Amsterdam
8 (June 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/wfa/
wfasecure/upload/2012_PA_272166_661442_382505.pdf. The logic follows that, if innovators
were compensated proportionally to the future success of their work product, they would be willing
to work harder. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138-40 (1966).

47. See Koudijs, supranote 46, at 8.
48. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 907 (1961).
49. Newkirk & Robertson, supra note 45.
50. Id.
51. See id. (discussing numerous theories for allowing insider trading).
52. MANNE, supranote 46, at 139-40.
53. See id. at 138.
54. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 133-81 (2d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW]. However, it is important to note that these contentions
are highly disputed. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,599
(proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249). For example, even
the federal government recognizes that insider trading is not a victimless crime. See id. (recognizing
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The American development of a body of formal insider trading law
is relatively recent, and it has taken place primarily through the court
system. 55 Before insider trading was recognized as a separate offense,
questions relating to the validity of a stock trade were rarely brought to
court.56 In the rare instance that such a case was brought before the
court, it was advanced under common law theories of fraud and
misrepresentation. 57 It was not easy to succeed on this legal theory,
however, because certain elements of common law fraud were not
intuitively present in the insider trading context.58 As more cases
regarding securities trading disputes came before the SEC and federal
courts, insider trading was formally recognized and three distinct
theories for establishing liability were developed: the classical theory,
the tipper-tippee theory, and the misappropriation theory. 59
1. Classical Theory
The first theory of insider trading liability to be formally recognized
was the classical theory. 60 The classical theory only applies to two
categories of people: (1) corporate insiders who are agents of the
company on whose information the individual is trading; and (2) certain
individuals who obtain their information directly from such an insider,
and thus to whom the agency relationship can be extended. 6' The first
that "the fundamental unfairness of insider trading harms both individual investors... [and] the
very foundations of our markets, by undermining investor confidence in the integrity of the
markets").
55. Seligman, supra note 20, at 2. The SEC has subsequently codified most of the substance
of court decisions. Nagy, Congressional Officials, supra note 21, at 1110. Some scholars suggest
that Congress specifically failed to codify insider trading as a violation of law because such
regulation would indirectly target behavior that they themselves were taking part in. See, e.g., J.
Scott Colesanti, "We'll Know It When We Can't Hear It": A Callfor a Non-pornography Test
Approach to Recognizing Non-public Information, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 539, 542 & n. 15 (2006)
(observing that numerous scholars have drawn this conclusion).
56. See John W. Bagby, The Evolving Controversy Over Insider Trading, 24 AM. BUS. L.J.
571, 573-75 (1987) (highlighting the sparse case precedent set by courts regarding insider trading
before the 1960s).
57. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419,429, 434-35 (1909) (analyzing a dispute arising
out of the transfer of stock under a theory of fraud).
58.

WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS

ORGANIZATION 615 (3d ed. 2009). Because all five elements of common law fraud had to be proven
for a claim to succeed, "the fraud remedy was generally not available when the buyer or seller
simply failed to disclose a material fact without overt deception." Id.
59. See, e.g., Jerke, supranote 21, at 1478.
60. See David T. Cohen, Note, Old Rule, New Theory. Revising the Personal Benefit
Requirementfor Tipper/TippeeLiability Under the MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading, 47
B.C. L. REV. 547, 552 (2006).
61. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983) (citing Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980)). This second category includes constructive insiders (lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals given temporary access to company information) who have
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time that a corporate insider's trading behavior was adjudicated as a
violation of the Securities Exchange Act 62 was in In re Cady, Roberts &
Co.63 Although this was only an administrative decision, not a federal
court case, it was a landmark decision because it paved the way for
64
federal courts to consider the issue a few years later.
In Cady, the SEC held both a company director and the person to
whom he communicated his information (his broker) liable for insider
trading when they traded on the director's knowledge that the company
was reducing its dividend.6 5 In convicting the director and broker, the
Commission focused its analysis on the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act.66 These provisions bring certain trading
behavior under the umbrella of fraud, manipulation, and deception in
circumstances that, without the Securities Exchange Act, would not
otherwise satisfy the common law requirements for such charges.67
The Commission held that the director and broker breached their
duty the moment they traded on the non-public information; trading on
the information was an act of deception that harmed the people with
whom they dealt in the financial market, including the corporation's
shareholders to whom they owed fiduciary duties.68 This held true
regardless of whether the person trading on the basis of the knowledge
was a company insider or merely someone who obtained their
information from an insider. 69 The director's affirmative duty to abstain
from trading on non-public information transferred to anyone who the
director later offered the information to and who subsequently traded in
reliance on it because the corporation's shareholders were directly
harmed by such action to the same extent as if the director traded on the
information himself.7" To cure the harm caused here, the agent had the
option of disclosing the non-public information before he traded
on it.7' If he either could not or chose not to do so before the

"entered into a special confidential relationship" with the company and obtained their information
directly from the company for legitimate business purposes only. See id. at 655 n.15.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006).
63. 40 S.E.C. 907, 907 (1961).
64. See Cohen, supra note 60, at 553-54.
65. Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 907.
66. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see Cady, 40 S.E.C.
at 910-11.
67. Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 910.
68. Id. at911-12.
69. Id. at 911.
70. Id.
71. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss1/20
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then he had the absolute duty to forgo the
information went public,
72
altogether.
transaction
Only seven years after the SEC decided Cady, the Second Circuit
applied its reasoning in deciding SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 73 The
court held company employees liable for insider trading when they
purchased company stock in advance of a public announcement of a
geophysical study very favorable to the company and its stock price. 74
Again, the court narrowed in on the SEC's Rule lOb-5 and its antifraud
provisions.75 In its reasoning, the court focused on the idea that there are
expectations in securities markets "that all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information." 76 The court elaborated on the timing requirement of
Cady's abstain or disclose alternative.77 It held that, "[b]efore insiders
may act upon material information, such information must have been
effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availability to
the investing public., 78 The decision emphasized a policy of equal
access to information.79
The next landmark case in the development of the classical theory
of insider trading law came twelve years after Texas Gulf Sulphur.8" In
Chiarella v. United States,8 the Supreme Court relied on the classical
theory of insider trading to reverse the lower court's conviction of
petitioner, an employee of a financial newspaper who obtained and
subsequently traded on non-public information while setting up the
newspaper layout.82 Petitioner had no connection to the companies in
whose stock he traded. 83 He did not obtain any information from the
companies themselves or in any way other than from his employer.84
Petitioner did not disclose any information before or during the time he

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id
401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968).
at 842, 857.
See id.
Id. at 847-48.
Id. at 848.
See id. at 854.

78.

Id.

79. Id. at 848. Although the holding of this case largely stands today, the court's policy
arguments supporting the rule have varied. See Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 18, at
287-88.
80. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW, supra
note 54, at 49 (explaining that Chiarellawas the first case to significantly reduce the scope of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur holding).
81. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
82. Id. at 228, 231, 236-37.
83. Id.at224,231.
84. Id.
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traded on the information in the market.8 5 Continuing to rely on the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act,8 6 the Court reasoned
that an individual who trades on non-public information cannot be
penalized for failifig
to disclose this information if he had no affirmative
8 7
duty to do SO.
The Court specifically provided that the mere possession of nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose.8 8 Because
petitioner was neither an agent nor any other type of fiduciary of the
companies on whose information he traded, and thus had no duty to
those corporations' shareholders, he did not violate the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act and could not be liable for
insider trading. 89 This case also briefly touched on the foundation of the
third insider trading theory, the misappropriation theory, in dicta, but the
Court did not conclusively address the theory because the issue was not
raised in the lower court. 90
As the classical theory of insider trading developed and solidified,
two distinct elements emerged that are required for a court to convict an
individual of insider trading: (1) the existence of a relationship that
provides access to non-public information intended only for corporate
purposes; and (2) manipulation or deception derived from the possessor
of such information trading on it without prior disclosure, thereby
making "secret profits." 91 The key requirement under this theory is the
existence of a duty owed by the trader to the corporation of whose shares
he traded (and, as an extension, to its shareholders).9 2 Under the classic
theory, without the existence of such a duty, a person can trade on nonpublic information without any consequences under the Securities and
Exchange Act.93
2. Tipper-Tippee Liability
Tipper-tippee liability developed as an extension of the classical
theory.94 This theory was created because the tippee was seen to inherit
85. Id.at 224.
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
87. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 228.
88. Id.at 235.
89. Id. at 236-37.
90.

See id.at 235-36.

91. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961)).
92. See id
93. See id.at 654. Note, however, that Chiarella would probably have been decided
differently under the misappropriation theory. See Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 18, at

290-92.
94. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58 (focusing analysis around whether there is a relationship of
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an obligation arising from his role in the tipper's breach of fiduciary
duty.95 The primary case through which the Court explained this
extension is Dirks v. SEC.96 In this case, the Court held that a person
who merely tells others of information he discovers about a company,
without himself trading in that company's stock, does not violate the
prohibition on insider trading if he does not have any fiduciary
relationship with the company. 97 The Court created a tippee liability
derivative of the tipper's liability,9" largely because the information had
been received by the tippee improperly. 99 Therefore, the tippee can only
have a duty not to trade on the information "when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty... by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach."' 100 The test for a breach of duty is whether the insider will
somehow "benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure" of the
information. 1 1 However, subsequent courts have interpreted this benefit
requirement very loosely. 10 2 Therefore, if there was an initial breach
by the corporate insider, courts will likely find that anyone else
who the tipper told and who traded on that information is liable for
insider trading.'° 3
3. Misappropriation Theory
Because the classical theory, and its extension through tipper-tippee
liability, only applied to corporate insiders and others to whom their
agency relationship extended, the SEC could not hold a non-fiduciary
liable when he obtained non-public information and traded on it. 10 4 This

trust between the trader and the provider of the material non-public information).
95. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230.
96. 463 U.S. 646 (1983); BAINBR1DGE, SECURITIES LAW, supra note 54, at 55.
97. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
98. Id. at 659. Dirks noted that it is "unlawful to do indirectly by means of any other person
any act made unlawful by the federal securities laws." Id.(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2006)).
99. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
100. Id.
101. Id.at662.
102. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he gain does not always
have to be pecuniary. A reputational benefit that translates into future earnings, a quid pro quo, or a
gift to a trading friend or relative all could suffice to show that the tipper personally benefitted.");
SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 632-33 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding an inference of personal benefit when
the tipper and tippee were close personal friends and had done each other several favors over the
years).
103. See Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 18, at 289-90 (identifying several
scenarios in which a tippee can be held liable for insider trading).
104. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236-37 (1980) (declining to consider
the misappropriation theory).
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gap in the law led to the development of the misappropriation theory of
insider trading, which recognizes the existence of an agency relationship
between the trader and the source of his information, regardless of where
that source was employed or how he obtained his information. 10 5 Lower
courts began recognizing
and applying the misappropriation theory as
10 6
early as the 1980s.
The first Supreme Court case to hold an individual liable for insider
trading under this theory was United States v. O'Hagan.10 7 In this case,
the Supreme Court held the respondent attorney liable for insider trading
when he traded in a company's stock on non-public information
obtained in the scope of his employment. 10 8 This was not a case of a
constructive insider, because the company was not a client of
respondent's law firm; instead, the firm's client, from which the
information was obtained, was a company attempting to take over the
company whose stock was traded. 10 9 The Court reasoned that, even
though the trader had no fiduciary duty to the company whose stock he
traded, the trader's use of non-public information deprived the source (in
this case, the firm's client) of its exclusive use of the information." 0
This extension of insider trading theory was consistent with established
precedent, which held that a company's confidential information is the
property of the company, and therefore the company has the right to its
exclusive use."' Misappropriation is a theory that punishes deception
when one person, who need not be a fiduciary of the company in
question, trusts another with confidential information, and the second
2
party breaches that trust by using the information for personal gain. 1
When released, the O 'Hagan decision was viewed by most scholars
as a wide-sweeping expansion of insider trading law. 113 In deciding the
case, the Court went far beyond the bounds that anyone ever expected it,

105. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 & n.4, 652 (1997).
106. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408-11 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 824 (3d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1981). Other circuits courts have rejected the
misappropriation theory. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995).
107. 521 U.S. at 665-66.
108. Id. at 647.
109. See id.
110. See id.at 652-53.
11. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987).
112. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.
113. See, e.g., Christopher J. Bebel, A DetailedAnalysis of United States v. O'Hagan: Onward
Through the Evolution of the FederalSecurities Laws, 59 LA. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (1998) (highlighting
the strength of the opinion's language and how it increased the types of fraud forbidden by insider
trading law).
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because it could have sustained a ruling in favor of the government on
much narrower grounds than it chose. 4 The Court expressed "a
willingness to embrace government arguments while displaying nearly
complete disregard for countervailing viewpoints." ' 1 5 The decision also
16
left many gaps for future courts to interpret with very little guidance.
Shortly after the decision was reached, scholars concluded that the full
reach of insider trading under the misappropriation theory was anything
but clear, and they expected the theory to expand and cover many more
types of relationships." 7 Overall, the O'Hagan decision seemed to give
the SEC the Court's blessing to continue to prosecute all types of cases
under insider trading law."18
As financial markets have become more complex" 9 and insiders
have become more financially tied to the corporations that employ
them, 2 ° the development of insider trading law has evolved to broaden
the definition of an insider trading violator to encompass almost anyone
who possesses and trades on material non-public information in breach
of a duty. 2' Nonetheless, there is still a fierce debate as to whether any
of these theories would apply to members of Congress who have traded
on information that they obtained in their scope of employment.' 22
114. See id.at 56 & nn.239-40, 57 & n.241.
115. Id.at 56.
116. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don'tAsk, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v.
O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 176 (1998).
117. See, e.g.,id. at 200, 208.
118. See Bebel, supra note 113, at 57 ("Due to the strength of the opinion, enforcement
authorities will be emboldened in the never-ending quest to make new applications of Section 10(b),
and anti-fraud provisions generally, while pursuing securities-related conduct characterized by
deception and inherent unfairness.").
119. See Bruce Ian Carlin & Gustavo Manso, Obfuscation, Learning, and the Evolution of
Investor Sophistication, 24 REv. FiN. STUD. 754, 778 (2010) (concluding that individual investors
typically cannot keep up with market evolutions because markets develop at too brisk a pace for the
average investor to learn of all changes).
120. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 3-4 (2002) (acknowledging that a large portion of executive compensation comes
from stock options).
121. See Adam R. Nelson, Note, Extending Outsider Trading Liability to Thieves, 80
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2157, 2181-84, 2196-97 (2012) (arguing that, under current law, insider trading
liability can even logically be extended to thieves who steal the information on which they
subsequently trade); see also, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 43-44 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that a hacker who does not owe a fiduciary duty to the company can be liable for insider trading
when he hacks into the company's computer system to obtain material non-public information).
122. Compare Nagy, CongressionalOfficials, supra note 21, at 1137 (arguing that the law as it
stood before the STOCK Act clearly extended to members of Congress), with Barbabella et al.,
supra note 21, at 216-17 (articulating the need for clear legislation regulating congressional trading
activities). Nagy believes that members of Congress can be prosecuted under the misappropriation
theory without any additional legislative grant, and that any attempt to regulate members of
Congress separately would narrow the discretion with which the SEC could otherwise act. Nagy,
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Regardless of whether a successful argument can be made to extend
insider trading laws to apply to members of Congress, the SEC has never
pursued a single case of insider trading against a congressional
official. 123 Therefore, it is clear that the SEC needs further explicit
guidance before it is willing
to pursue a case of insider trading against a
24
member of Congress. 1
B.

The CurrentState ofInsider Trading in Congress

Insider trading by members of Congress is a real problem.125 A
1995 study conducted by Professor Gregory Boller uncovered numerous
conflicts of interest between the personal trading portfolios of particular
members of Congress and the pieces of legislation those very same
members of Congress were active in pushing to get passed. 126 Although
Professor Boller did not examine the financial returns of those
legislators' portfolios, he took note of the uncanny timing legislators
seemed to have in executing
their trades before both the rise and fall of a
27
company's stock price. 1
A 2004 financial study by several business and finance professors
analyzed the financial returns of legislators' personal portfolios over a
six-year period, based on the information contained in legislators'
financial disclosure statements, and compared those returns with market28
returns and professional traders' returns over the same time period.

CongressionalOfficials, supra note 21, at 1132, 1148. Barbabella and his colleagues, on the other
hand, believe that the simple fact that there is even a debate concerning the applicability of current
law to members of Congress justifies the need for further regulation. Barbabella et al., supra note
21, at 217.
123. Steinhauer, supra note 24.
124. See Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 18, at 304; Devin Leonard, Outmanned,
Outgunned, and on a Roll, Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 2012, at 62-63 (highlighting the restrictions that
budgetary constraints place on the SEC's enforcement capabilities). It is understandable why the
SEC has failed to take action without explicit guidance. Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note
18, at 304. The SEC's budget is granted by Congress, and the legislature could easily shrink the
SEC's budget if it acts in a way that is not in accordance with Congress's desires. See id.
125. See Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returnsfrom the Common Stock Investments of
the US. Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 667, 674 (2004) [hereinafter Ziobrowski et
al., US. Senate] (analyzing the performance of legislators' stock portfolios in comparison to
portfolios of professional traders and fund managers, and concluding that there is a large and
positive difference between legislators' portfolio retums and market returns).
126. Joy Ward, Taking Stock in Congress, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1995,
http://www.motherjones.comnpolitics/1995/09/taking-stock-congress; see also Robert O'Harrow Jr.
& Dan Keating, When Public Duties and Private Investments Intersect, WASH. POST, June 14,
2010, at A6 (observing that many committee chairmen and high-ranking members have millions of
dollars invested in industries they oversee).
127. See Ward, supra note 126.
128. Ziobrowski et al., US. Senate, supra note 125, at 669.
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The study concluded that, for all but two years of the time period
examined, there was a consistent pattern of cumulative abnormal returns
within legislators' portfolios. 129 Senators with the least seniority attained
the highest levels of returns in financial markets. 130 This suggests that
the enormous amount of new information available to legislators was
primarily utilized in their first few years in office. 3 1 Also of great
importance in this context is the fact that securities held in legislators'
portfolios greatly outperformed the market for the duration of time that
they remained within the legislators' portfolios. 132 However, once the
legislators sold their holdings of these securities, their stock price almost
immediately returned to average or below-average performance as
compared to the 133market's performance as a whole and the stock's
historic behavior.
The same group of business and finance professors recently
completed a similar study using identical methods in relation to the
personal trading portfolios of members of the House of
Representatives. 34 This study examined a longer time period, extending
from 1985 to 2001.1 The study found that trading among members of
the House of Representatives was not as widespread as among Senators,
but that a small number of Representatives traded "disproportionately
often., 136 In a similar fashion to the findings regarding Senators, this
study found that the Representatives who had the least seniority had
portfolios with the highest returns. 137 Overall, the findings
of the House
138
study closely mirror the findings in the Senate study.
Even scholars who disagree with the proposition that congressional
trading should be banned or regulated acknowledge the conflict of
interest problems that underlie legislators' trading in securities
markets. 139 Rather than disputing the existence of potential conflicts of
129. Id. at 674.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 674-75.
132. Id.at 674.
133. Id; see also Kim, supra note 17 (observing that Senators appear to know exactly when to
sell their stock).
134. Compare Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock
Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 13 Bus. & POL. 1, 18 (2011)
[hereinafter
Ziobrowski
et al.,
U.S. House of Representatives], available at
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol13/lissl/art4, with Ziobrowski et al., U.S. Senate, supra note 125.
135. Ziobrowski et al., U.S. House of Representatives, supranote 134, at 6.
136. See id. at9.
137. Id.at 14.
138. See id. at 18.
139. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive
Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 35, 37 (2006) (arguing that, as long as outsiders' trading does
not interfere with property rights, it should be allowed; it could even encourage better investigation
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interest between legislators' official duties and their personal financial
portfolios, these scholars typically focus their arguments on the
questions of whether it is appropriate to regulate legislators' trading
behavior and whether market integrity is being hurt by allowing
members of Congress to trade freely on non-public information. 140 Even
the authors of the most critical study of the evidence supporting
congressional trading have acknowledged that legislators' portfolios are
disproportionately invested in sectors of the economy over which they
exert direct influence, and that these portions of their portfolios greatly
outperform the rest of their portfolios.14' Therefore, even if legislators'
portfolios as a whole do not beat average market returns, it is undisputed
that legislators benefit in some way from their positions on Capitol
Hill. 142 This is no small accession for143scholars who sharply contest the
need to regulate this type of behavior.
In addition to directly trading in financial markets, legislators also
take part in the political intelligence industry.' 44 This industry is
"discrete and virtually unknown" to the general public. 145 What little is
known typically comes from media reports and lobbying firms'
promotional materials. 146 Political intelligence gatherers "mine the
capital for information and translate Washington wonkspeak into trading
tips" before the information becomes public. 147 They do not seek to
influence Congress at all; they only seek to gather information from its
members. 148 The industry began in the early 1970s, but has really taken
off following the exponential growth in the hedge fund industry. 149 The
and monitoring); Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics when
Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REv. 131, 151 (2009) (contending that the real
problem lies not in legislators' individual trading behavior, but in their disclosure of information to
political allies before it becomes public knowledge); Larry E. Ribstein, Congressmen as Security
Traders, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 269, 269, 273 (2011) [hereinafter Ribstein, Congressmen as Security
Traders] (suggesting that legislators should be allowed to invest freely in order to give them a
personal stake in their regulation).
140. See Ribstein, Congressmen as Security Traders, supra note 139, at 273.
141. Andrew Eggers & Jens Hainmueller, Political Capital: The (Mostly) Mediocre
Performance of Congressional Stock Portfolios, 2004-2008, at 21 (The Leitner Program, Yale
University, Working Paper No. 2011-02, 2011), available at http://www.yale.edu/Ileitner/resources/
papers/Eggmueller_2011-02.pdf.
142. See id.
143. See Ribstein, Congressmen as Security Traders, supra note 139, at 273-74 (urging
strongly that the trading behavior of members of Congress should be let alone).
144. See Jerke, supranote 21, at 1461.
145. See id. at 1455.
146. Id. at 1471-72.
147. Eamon Javers, Washington Whispers to Wall Street, Bus. WK., Dec. 26, 2005, at 42.
148. Jerke, supra note 21, at 1472.
149. See Juliet Chung, Hedge-Fund Assets Rise to Record Level, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2012,
4:07 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304331204577354043852093400.html
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information gatherers are primarily employees of lobbying firms,
especially those who work for financial companies. 50 This is largely
to regulation, even though lobbying
because the industry is not subject
51
1
participants.
primary
firms are
The Lobbying Disclosure Act, 152 the primary piece of legislation
governing lobbying firms, does not apply to the political intelligence
industry; by the statute's definition, a lobbyist is only subject to the law
if he seeks to influence legislation.153 Political intelligence lobbyists do
not seek to influence legislation; they only inquire as to the status of
existing legislation. 154 Because political intelligence firms are not subject
to the law, they are not even required to disclose the identity of their
political intelligence clients. 55 Despite the little knowledge available
about the inner workings of the industry, it is clear that legislators
participate in it; members of Congress and their staff are the only people
56
who know the political information in advance of its public release. 1
Legislators' trading habits are particularly serious because
Congress has gained direct control over so many aspects of the nation's
economy in the wake of the recent financial crisis. 157 There is no
question that legislators' behavior needs to be regulated to prevent them
from unfairly profiting from their insider knowledge, both for market
efficiency and ethical reasons.' 58 The STOCK Act as written is nowhere
5 9 With the addition
near strong enough to regulate legislators' behavior. 1'

(observing that the hedge fund industry was valued at $2.13 trillion in April 2012 and continues to
grow); Javers, supra note 147 (recognizing that hedge funds have sparked the recent growth in the
political intelligence industry and are suspected to be the industry's largest clients).
150. See Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in
Washington, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at Al.
151. See Jerke, supra note 21, at 1472.
152. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1612 (2006).
153. Id. §§ 1602(7)-(9); see also Jerke, supra note 21, at 1475.
154. Jerke, supranote 21, at 1472.
155. Id. at 1471-72.
156. See Javers, supra note 147 (documenting a 2005 instance in which the prominence of the
political intelligence industry reared its head when a company's stock price unexplainably doubled
in a single day-a day before the public announcement of a bill in Congress that would greatly
benefit the company); Mullins & Scannell, supra note 150, at Al (describing a similar incident in
which the shares of companies involved in asbestos litigation inexplicably rose before Congress
announced the creation of a public trust fund for liability claims).
157. See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Star.
115 (legislating in the areas of tax, healthcare, education, infrastructure, and energy, among others,
in an attempt to stimulate the economy); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (creating the federal bailout program that allowed the federal
government to purchase billions of dollars worth of distressed assets from banks and other
institutions).
158. SeeinfraPartlI.B.
159. See infra Part HI.
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of several amendments to make it stronger, however, the STOCK Act
has the potential to be a key piece of legislation
in solving this widely
0
recognized, but largely unaddressed, problem.16
C. Pre-STOCKAct FinancialReportingRequirementsfor
Members of Congress
Although it was unclear prior to the passage of the STOCK Act
whether members of Congress could be held liable for insider trading
under securities law, there were still numerous provisions in place in
other laws that required legislators to report their financial holdings and
transactions. 161 For example, prior to the passage of the STOCK Act,
members of Congress (as well as other senior government officials) were
required to file annual reports disclosing their personal assets and
investments, including outside income, securities transactions, real
estate, and all types of bank accounts. 162 These annual reports were made
available to the public.163 Nevertheless, the purpose of these disclosure
reports was not to catch violations of securities law.' 64 According to the
U.S. Office of Government Ethics:
[T]he primary purpose of disclosure is to assist agencies in
identifying potential conflicts of interest between a filer's official
duties and the filer's private financial interests and affiliations. Once a
reviewing official identifies a potential conflict of interest and consults
with the filer's supervisor as necessary, several remedies are
available to avoid65an actual or apparent violation of Federal ethics laws
and regulations. 1

160. See infra Part IV.
161. See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 101-102, 92 Stat.
1824, 1824-31. It is important to note, however, that the Ethics in Government Act was not passed
primarily to regulate government employees' trading behavior but to prevent insider trading. See id.
The stated purpose of the act was "[t]o establish certain Federal agencies, effect certain reforms in
the operation of the Federal Government, to implement certain reforms in the operation of the
Federal Government and to preserve and promote the integrity of public officials and institutions,
and for other purposes." Id. pmbl. Thus, the financial disclosure requirement included in this Act
was only one of numerous ways in which Congress sought to clean up government in the wake of
the Watergate scandal. Benjamin R. Civiletti, U.S. Attorney Gen., Post-Watergate Legislation in
Retrospect 3 (Oct. 31, 1980), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/
73468NCJRS.pdf.
162. Ethics in Government Act §§ 101-102.
163. § 104.
164. Public Financial Disclosure, U.S. OFFICE OF GOV'T ETHics, http://www.oge.gov/
Financial-Disclosure/Public-Financial-Disclosure-278/Public-Financial-Disclosure
(last visited
Nov. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Public FinancialDisclosure].
165. Id.
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This statement makes clear that, although these disclosure requirements
were in place to serve a particular purpose, that purpose was not to
penalize legislators for inappropriate trading behavior. 166 Therefore, this
167
statute's purpose is not similar to that served by the STOCK Act.
Because these disclosure requirements were not intended to police
legislators' trading activity, there was virtually no supervision of this
were essentially free to behave as they wished
activity and legislators 68
without fear of penalty.
Despite the fact that some form of regulation was still in place,
there were also subjects addressed by the STOCK Act that had either
never before been addressed in such detailed form or had previously
gone unregulated altogether. 169 For example, the types of disclosures
required under the Ethics in Government Act 170 were not as detailed as
the ones required under the STOCK Act. 17 ' Additionally, there was no
regulation of the participation of legislators in IPO allocations or 72of
political intelligence activities before the passage of the STOCK Act. 1
D. The STOCK Act
The STOCK Act was signed into law on April 4, 2012.17' The bill
was passed by an overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress;
the House of Representatives voted 417 to 2 in support of the bill, and
166. See id.
167. Compare Ethics in Government Act pmbl., with Stop Trading on Congressional
Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291, 291 (identifying the purpose of
disclosure requirements as preventing government officials from using non-public information for
personal gain).
168. See To Amend the Ethics in Government Act: Hearingon S.2214 Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of Gov't Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 99th Cong. 1 (1986). The idea
was that the public would be eager to police their representatives' behavior, and public access to
legislators' filings would eliminate some responsibility from other areas of the government. See id.
If there was a red flag raised in the filings, members of the public would bring it to the attention of
proper authorities. See Jerke, supra note 21, at 1469-70.
169. Compare Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act §§ 4, 6-8 (regulating insider
trading, financial transaction reporting, political intelligence, and financial disclosure forms), with
Ethics in Government Act § 104 (failing to provide for many details about financial disclosures or
addressing political intelligence at all).
170. Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 101-102, 92 Stat. 1824, 1824-31 (1978).
171. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 6.
172. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: The STOCK Act:
Bans Members of Congress from Insider Trading (Apr. 4, 2012), available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/04/fact-sheet-stock-act-bans-memberscongress-insider-trading (describing how the provisions of the Act alter existing law and add to the
requirements already in place); see also Jerke, supra note 21, at 1470-75. Although political
intelligence activities are considered a form of lobbying, they are not subject to the Lobbying
Disclosure Act because of a loophole in the definition of"lobbying" in the act. Id.
173. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, 126 Stat. 291, 305.
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the Senate voted 96 to 3 in favor of it. 174 According to Senator Kirsten
Gillibrand of New York, one of the Act's authors and sponsors, the Act
is intended to signify that "nobody is above the law" and that "members
of Congress must play by the exact same set of rules as every other
American." 175 Widespread congressional support for the bill, or at least
the fagade of widespread congressional support for a politically popular
measure in the middle176of an election year, was clearly present at the time
of the Act's passage.
The Act purports to regulate most financial behavior of members
and employees of all three branches of the federal government. 177 With
respect to members of Congress, the primary behaviors regulated are
financial market transactions, 178 mortgage transactions, 179 and IPO
transactions. 180 Other provisions of the Act provide enforcement
mechanisms and rules of construction that simply aid in interpreting and
carrying out the above provisions.181
Before addressing any of the specific areas of regulation and
reporting requirements already mentioned, the Act expressly clarifies
that insider trading prohibitions, as they exist, extend to members of
Congress and their employees. 182 In order for this assertion to logically
conform to the elements of existing insider trading law, the Act
explicitly creates a duty owed by each member and employee of
Congress. 183 More specifically, the Act states:
[E]ach Member of Congress or employee of Congress owes a duty
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the
United States Government, and the citizens of the United States with
respect to material, nonpublic information derived from such person's
174. See S.2038: STOCK Act, N.Y. TIMES, http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/bills/l12/
s2038 (last visited Nov. 23, 2012). Overwhelming congressional support is no surprise, given the
loud presidential call for action and the congressional desire to improve its public image. See
Obama, supranote 1; see also Hulse, supranote 8.
175. Robert Pear, Obama Signs Ban on Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS, Apr. 5, 2012,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EODE3DF1 73EF936A35757COA9649D8B
63&partner-rssnyt&emc~rss.
176. See Hulse, supra note 8 (acknowledging that the bill was popular among constituents and
that legislators were looking for ways to enhance their reputations in the wake of an upcoming
election when their approval ratings were at an all-time low).
177. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act §§ 3-4, 6-9, 11-14. Although the Act
imposes requirements on all branches of the federal government, the regulations imposed on the
executive and judicial branches are beyond the scope of this Note.
178. Id.§6.
179. Id. § 13.
180. Id. § 12.
§ 5.
181. See, e.g., id.
182. Id.§ 4.
183. Id. § 4(b).
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position as a Member of Congress or employee of Congress or gained
from the performance of such person's official responsibilities. 184

Based on this language, there can be no question that members of
Congress now owe a duty similar to that required under insider trading
theory as applied to corporate insiders. 185 Whether this duty conforms to
the classical or misappropriation theory is irrelevant to the issue at
hand; 186 since there is some type of explicit duty involved, members
of
187
Congress can be prosecuted under some form of insider trading.
The first new regulation regarding the financial behavior of
members of Congress mentioned in the STOCK Act deals with the
reporting of financial transactions. 8 8 The Act requires that legislators
file a report of any financial transactions they participated in within
thirty to forty-five days of the transaction's occurrence, depending on
which section of the Act the transaction falls under. 189 As compared to
the previous reporting requirement mandating members of Congress to
report their personal financial investments yearly, 190 this provision is
intended to decrease the amount of time it takes for government ethics
committees to uncover a legislator's trades in the financial markets, and
thus increase the likelihood that red flags will be raised and addressed.' 9'
However, it is unclear from the text of the Act who will be responsible
184. Id. § 4(b)(2).
185. Compare id., with Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1979) (holding that
insider trading liability arises out of "a relationship of trust and confidence" between the trader and
his counterparty in the transaction). However, note that some scholars believe this duty to be
insufficient for insider trading purposes. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 18, at
295. Although not a widely-accepted theory, a few scholars have argued that a general duty to a
group without a direct connection to the trading activity is insufficient to establish liability for
insider trading. Id. This theory holds that a duty must apply either to the person with whom the
insider trades or the source of the information traded on in order to establish liability. Id. Therefore,
under this theory, a duty to the general public would not be adequate to hold an individual liable for
insider trading. See id. Others counter this by pointing out that lower courts do not always follow
Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the GradualDemise of
Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1315, 1340 (2009). Although precedent mandates a
fiduciary relationship in order to establish liability, some lower courts have disregarded this in favor
of a broader rule banning any wrongful use of material non-public information. Id.
186. The issue here is only whether members of Congress can be prosecuted for insider trading
in general. Determining the theory under which they can be prosecuted is the next step in the
analysis.
187. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4(b)(2),
126 Stat. 291.
188. Id.§ 6.
189. Id.
190. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 101-102, 92 Stat. 1824,
1824-31.
191. See The Stop Trading on CongressionalKnowledge Act: Hearingon H.R. 1148 Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 2, 9-10 (2011) (statements of Rep. Jeb Hensarling and Rep.
Louise M. Slaughter).
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for reviewing these filings, and what exactly they will be charged with
looking to uncover. 192 Although the Act prescribes penalties for breaches
of legislators' duty in the form
of insider trading, 193 it is unclear how
94
enforced.
strictly they will be
The second major provision of the Act requires federal employees
to report their personal mortgage loans in their financial disclosure
reports.195 The Ethics in Government Act specifically exempted from
disclosure requirements the reporting of mortgage loans by federal
employees and their spouses. 196 Under the STOCK Act, however, only
certain mid-level officials within the executive's foreign affairs
offices
97
and the military are exempted from this reporting regulation.
The final major provision of the Act prohibits legislators from
purchasing securities subject to an IPO in any way other than through
the methods available to the general public. 98 This section of the Act is
the shortest of the regulatory provisions at only a single sentence long.199
It does not provide any details or guidance as to how the provision
should be interpreted or applied.200 It is somewhat of an anomaly
compared to the remainder of the provisions, which at least offer some
means of interpretation. 201
III.

THE STOCK ACT'S SHORTCOMINGS

It is no secret that the STOCK Act has major shortcomings,
especially compared with what it purports to accomplish. 2 Jonathan
Macey, a Yale Law School professor and critic of the Act, has observed
that "what Congress really wants is to keep making the big bucks that
come from trading on inside information but to trick those outside
of the Beltway into believing that they are doing something

192.

See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 6.

193. Id.§ 15(b).
194. See id. (lacking any enforcement mechanism).
195. Id.§ 13.
196. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 102(a)(4)(A), 92 Stat. 1824,
1826.
197. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 13.
198. Id.§ 12.
199. Id.("An individual ... may not purchase securities that are the subject of an initial public
offering... in any manner other than is available to members of the public generally.").
200.

Id.

201. Compare id (offering no guidance as to how to apply the provision), with id.§ 6
(providing details as to which government officials must report financial transactions under what
circumstances), and id. § 13 (detailing which government officials must report details of their
mortgage loans).
202.

See infra Part I.A-B.
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about this corruption., 20 3 Numerous other commentators have voiced
similar opinions. 204
There are two major flaws in the text of the Act as passed. °5 The
first is that the Act adds very little substance to the existing body of
insider trading law.20 6 The second is that the Act adds an additional layer
of complications in applying insider trading prohibitions to members of
Congress.20 7 These two issues combine to lead to the natural conclusion
that the Act has major shortcomings. 20 8 These flaws need to be
adequately addressed for the legislation to be considered effective
regulation, rather than a politically-motivated guise to gain popularity
before an important election.20 9
A.

The STOCK Act's Lack of Regulatory Substance

When examined as a whole, in comparison to existing legislation,
the STOCK Act does not add much substance to the existing body of
insider trading law as applied to members of Congress.2 1° In short, there
is only one provision of the Act that may add anything of substance to
existing law without including additional complications that outweigh
the benefits. 21 1 The Act attempts to end the fiduciary duty debate by
clearly extending insider trading prohibitions and liability for insider
212
trading violations to members of Congress. More specifically, the Act
explicitly creates a duty that legislators owe to Congress as a collective
whole, to the U.S. government, and to the citizens of the United
States. 213 This provision eliminates the decades-long scholarly

203. Jonathan Macey, Op-Ed., Congress's Phony Insider-TradingReform, WALL ST. J., Dec.
13, 2011, at A2 1.
204. See, e.g., Megan McArdle, The UnderwhelmingSTOCK Act, ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/201 I/1 1/the-underwhelming-stockPM),
3:36
act/248960 ("Congress should be holding itself to a higher standard than everyone else. But even
when pressed, it seems that they can't quite bring themselves to do it."); David Zeiler, Congress
Handing Out Stock Tips to Hedge Fund Managers, MONEY MORNING (Dec. 23,
2011), http://www.moneymoming.com/2011/12/23/congress-handing-out-stock-tips-to-hedge-fundmanagers ("[T]he STOCK Act will simply serve to enshrine Congress' immunity from securities
laws that the rest of us must abide by.... [1]t doesn't stop the insider trading.").
205. See infra Part HL.A-B.
206. See infra Part ll.A.
207. See infra Part ILB.
208. See infra Part IIL.A-B.
209. See infra Part lV.
210. ComparesupraPart lC, with supra Part ll.D.
211. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4(a),
126 Stat. 291, 292.
212. Id.
213. Id. § 4(b).
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debate over whether insider trading prohibitions extend to members
of Congress.214
All other provisions of the Act that add substance to the existing
body of law contain ambiguities or raise questions that further
complicate the Act's execution. 215 For example, the Act requires
legislators to report their financial transactions within a much shorter
timeframe than was previously required.2 16 However, as already
mentioned, the Act does not provide for any mechanism to make this
information useful for uncovering potential insider trading behavior.217
Additionally, it is unclear what body is supposed to review the
disclosure reports.2 8 If the information is utilized in the same way in
which financial disclosures were used under the Ethics in Government
Act, 21 it will do little to further the stated purpose of the Act.22 °
Regardless of how clear the language of the statute may be, technically
extending insider trading prohibitions to members of Congress is
toothless if there is no method of policing or enforcing such
prohibitions. 22' The Act also requires legislators to update their asset and
liability positions (including investment portfolios, all types of bank
214. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 18, at 293, 295 (concluding that
insider trading liability does not extend to members of Congress); Barbabella et al., supra note 2 1,
at 215-16 (finding that any restrictions on trading that members of Congress must follow are
extremely vague and ambiguous); Andrew George, Public (SeWl-Service: Illegal Trading on
Confidential CongressionalInformation, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 161, 170 (2008) (determining
that existing insider trading law applies to members of Congress); Nagy, CongressionalOfficials,
supra note 21, at 1137-59 (concluding that multiple theories of insider trading extend to members of
Congress).
215. See infra Part HIB.
216. Compare Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge § 6 (requiring reporting "[n]ot later
than 30 days after receiving notification of any transaction required to be reported under section
102(a)(5)(B), but in no case later than 45 days after such transaction"), with Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 101-102, 92 Stat. 1824, 1824-31 (requiring reporting "on or
before May 15 of the succeeding year").
217. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 6; see also supra Part I.D.
218. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 6. Congress is presumed to have left
the monitoring duty to laymen, in a continuance of the structure established in the Ethics in
Government Act. See Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on HomelandSec. and GovernmentalAffairs, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Melanie
Sloane, Executive Director, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington) (suggesting that
public disclosure is essential to any successful piece of legislation). Congress's presumption is that
the public will have a personal interest in monitoring the filings, and thus will be a watchdog and
will alert the proper authorities to any red flags that may arise. See id. at 153-54 (testimony of John
C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School).
219. See Public Financial Disclosure, supra note 164 ("[A] reviewing official identifies a
potential conflict of interest and consults with the filer's supervisor as necessary .... ").
220. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act pmbl.; Steinhauer, supranote 24.
221. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 6; Dan Auble, ACTION ALERT:
STOCK Act Reversal Signed by President, OPENSECRETS BLOG (Apr. 15, 2013, 1:27 PM),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/04/action-alert-stock-act-reversal-signed.html.
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accounts, and personal mortgages) more frequently and in a much more
thorough manner than was previously required.222 However, this
provision is useless without a way to police and enforce trading behavior
based on the information provided in the disclosure reports.22 3
Finally, the Act technically imposes new restrictions on legislators
with regard to IPO allocations.224 However, this provision is essentially
meaningless because it incorrectly assumes that IPOs operate in a
relatively uniform manner and that ordinary investors participate equally
in this process. 225 The legislative history on this topic is very sparse, and
the little that can be found in the record is vague. 226 It is thus relatively
unclear why this provision even made it into the final version of the
Act.227 This provision will be almost impossible to enforce because the
restriction on legislators' participation in IPOs is vaguely written;
enforcement will be especially problematic because the SEC-the
enforcement mechanism best suited for the job--is hesitant to overstep
its bounds and upset the government body that funds its operations.22 8
B. Additional Problems Created by the STOCK Act
In addition to failing to add much substance to the existing body of
law, the STOCK Act creates additional problems that may have
significant repercussions in the long run.229 For example, several
scholars have acknowledged a potential conflict between the STOCK
Act (or similar proposed regulations) and the Speech or Debate Clause
222. Compare Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 6 (requiring reporting no later
than forty-five days after a transaction takes place), with Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-521, §§ 101-102, 92 Stat. 1824, 1824-31 (requiring annual reporting, regardless of any
transactions that occur throughout the year).
223. See Auble, supranote 221.
224. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 12.
225. See STEVEN E. BOC14NER & JON C. AVINA, GUIDE TO THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 11
(7th ed. 2010) (documenting the complexity of the IPO process).
226. See The Stop Trading on CongressionalKnowledge Act: Hearingon H.R. 1148 Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011) (failing to address the question of IPOs); see also
Insider Trading and CongressionalAccountability: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on HomelandSec.
and GovernmentalAffairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (failing to address the question of IPOs).
227. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
228. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 12 (restricting legislators to
participating in IPOs only in the "manner... available to members of the public generally");
BOCHNER & AVINA, supra note 225, at 11, 72 (explaining that "[a]n initial public offering is
actually a series of related processes," and concluding that "[t]he laws and rules that govern the
[IPO] process... are complex and constantly changing"). It is understandable why the SEC has
failed to act up to this point without explicit guidance. George, supra note 214, at 172. The SEC's
budget is granted by Congress, and the legislature could easily shrink the SEC's budget if it acts in a
way that is not in accordance with Congress's desires. Id.
229. See infra notes 230-63 and accompanying text.
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in the Constitution. 230 The Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry
into those things said or done in Congress by legislators "in the
performance of official duties and into the motivation for such acts. 23 1
The Speech or Debate Clause, however, does not extend to protect
political matters that members of Congress engage in,232 and it does not
protect any activity that has no relation to the "functioning of the
legislative process. 2 33 Courts have not created a general test to
distinguish between what is and is not protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause,2 34 and arguments can be made that legislators' trading behavior
falls into the scope of the performance of official duties. 235 Although
most scholars have concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause would
not conflict with legislators' trading on insider information, there has not
yet been a firm governmental verdict on the issue.236
An additional problem that the Act creates is a privacy risk to
government officials who are required to disclose their financial position
and those of their immediate families.

237

The risk to individual

legislators and their families created by the Act's requirement that
members of Congress report all of their assets in fine detail, in an
extremely public forum, outweighs the public interest in promoting fair
and equitable markets.238 A federal court recently decided a case
regarding employees of the executive department. 239 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland issued a temporary preliminary
injunction enjoining the government from implementing portions of the

230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see, e.g., Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 18, at
302-03; Barbabella et al., supra note 21, at 217-19.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). More
specifically, the Speech or Debate Clause instructs that members of both houses of Congress:
shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to
and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
232. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.
233. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966).
234. Compare Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supra note 18, at 302, with Barbabella et al.,
supra note 21, at 217-18 (laying out different standards by which the applicability of the Speech or
Debate Clause is analyzed).
235. See, e.g., Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 16, 23 (2011) (statements of
Robert L. Walker, Counsel, Wiley Rein LLP, and Melanie Sloan, Executive Director, Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington).
236. See Barbabella et al., supranote 21, at 218-19.
237. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
238. See Senior Execs. Ass'n v. United States, 891 F. Supp. 2d 745, 755 (D. Md. 2012).
239. Id. at 755-56.
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STOCK Act related to these employees' financial disclosures.2 40 The
court held that the information required by the disclosures is far too
2 41
sensitive to be placed on the Internet with unrestricted access.
Although the court partially focused on the fact that certain executive
officials are faced with international security threats, 242 many of the
privacy arguments made relate to any government official whose
information will be accessible to anyone with a computer and Internet
access. 243 Case law relating to the STOCK Act's violation of
government officials' privacy quickly developed, 244 and Congress
wasted no time in taking action of its own.245
The House and Senate Ethics Committees are also left with too
much discretion in determining the definitions of the terms used in the
Act.246 There are four provisions of the Act that call for government
officials to issue "interpretive guidance" as to how the law will apply to
certain groups of government employees.24 7 Each of these provisions
grants the delegated authority the power to decide what does and does
not fall under the category of prohibited activity.248 In each instance, the
organization granted with this power is vested somewhere within the
branch that the particular provision of the Act applies to.249 As noted by
the distinguished Senator Charles Grassley, who was instrumental in
passing the Congressional Accountability Act, 250 after many failed
attempts, it is very difficult to get Congress to subject itself to laws it

240. Id. at 756.
241. Id. at 752.
242. Id. at 753.
243. See id.
244. See id
245. Craig Holman, CongressionalInsider Trading Revisited (But Don't Tell Anyone), ROLL
CALL (May 9, 2013, 1:14 P.M.), http://www.rollcall.com/news/congressional-insider-trading_
revisited but dont tellanyone commentary-224674-1.html. On April 15, 2013, Congress passed
an amendment to the STOCK Act that eliminated the reporting provisions as applied to executive
employees and congressional staffers. Online Access of Financial Disclosure Statements and Forms,
Pub. L. No. 113-7, § l(a)(1), 127 Stat. 438, 438 (2013). Although many think that this amendment
removed all teeth from the Act, the Act was largely ineffective even before the amendment was
passed. Compare Holman, supra(arguing that the Act could have been effective until the reporting
requirements were removed), with supra Part ILI.A (arguing that the Act was ineffective as passed,
and thus, it is irrelevant whether reporting requirements are included).
246. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 3,
126 Stat. 291, 292 (delegating the role of interpreting how the relevant rules to each chamber shall
apply to their members to Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate and the Committee on Ethics of
the House of Representatives).
247. See id. §§3, 9(a)(1)-(3).
248. See id
249. See id.
250. 2 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
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passes for the private sector. 25 1 Given this difficulty, it does not seem
like any interpretive guidance will truly restrict legislators' trading
behavior much, if at all.252 As a result of this practically unfettered
discretion, the two houses of the legislature have too much control
over the extent to which the STOCK Act applies to their
respective members.253
Finally, rather than directly regulating political intelligence
activities, the STOCK Act commissioned a report on the topic in order
to determine the role that political intelligence has in financial
markets.254 Congress is not ready to declare political intelligence a
problem-probably because government ethics experts do not view it as
a departure from or violation of existing ethics rules. 255 However, as

already articulated, political intelligence is a real problem in our
government and our markets.256 The industry earns more than $400
million each year.257 Hedge funds have found that the information

provided by politically-connected informants is very valuable in beating
the market.2 If gathering political intelligence was not a useful practice,
the practice would not continue to grow as significantly as it has in
recent years. 259 All types of insider trading-including political
intelligence tips-harm the public, individual investors, and the markets
as a whole. 260 The fundamental unfairness of these practices undermines
investor confidence in the integrity of the markets. 26' The lack of
investor confidence, in turn, undermines numerous characteristics that
American capitalism and free markets embody.262
251. See Charles Grassley & Jennifer Shaw Schmidt, Practicing What We Preach: A
Legislative History of CongressionalAccountability, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 33, 33, 35-36 (1998)
(describing the difficult process of passing the Congressional Accountability Act).
252. Id. at 36 ("[S]elf-regulation, when not conducted by a disinterested and neutral third party,
does not constitute credible regulation at all.").
253. Cf id (criticizing self-regulation in another piece of legislation purported to regulate the
behavior of members of Congress).
254. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act § 7.
255. See Javers, supra note 147 (summarizing ethics experts' argument that members of
Congress do not violate ethical standards because their decisions are made publicly and they are not
receiving any personal benefit in exchange for the information that they provide).
256. See supraPart H.B.
257. Brody Mullins & Susan Pulliam, Buying 'PoliticalIntelligence' Can Pay Off Bigfor Wall
Street, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at Al.
258. Mullins & Scannell, supra note 150; see also Mullins & Pulliam, supra note 257, at Al
(noting an industry researcher's observation that "the single largest source of gains for [hedge
funds] has been what is going on in Washington").
259. See Javers, supra note 147.
260. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,599 (proposed Dec.
28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, & 249).
261. Id.
262.

See Nelson Lichtenstein, Introduction, in AMERICAN CAPITALISM: SOCIAL THOUGHT AND
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A MORE EFFECTIVE ACT THAT EXTENDS BEYOND POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY TO EFFECTUATE REAL REGULATION

The STOCK Act fails to accomplish its stated goals, both
philosophically and practically. 263 On the philosophical level, the duty
that the Act creates for members of Congress does not conform to the
duty required by insider trading law.2 64 On the practical level, concrete
regulation of political intelligence-arguably the most influential and
controversial aspect of insider trading regarding members of Congresswas eliminated from the Act through the influence of powerful
lobbyists.26 5 In order for the Act to truly accomplish its stated purpose,
both of these problems must be remedied.26 6
A.

Lack of Consistency with Insider TradingLaw

The philosophical problem with the STOCK Act relates to the duty
that it created for members of Congress.267 As previously articulated,
insider trading liability revolves around the existence of a duty between
the trader and either the company whose stock is being traded or the
source of the insider information used in trading. 268 The duty that the
STOCK Act imposes on members of Congress, however, is only "one
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the
United States Government, and the citizens of the United States. ' 2 69 This
legislatively created duty has no connection to the information being
traded on or the company that has a property interest in its own
information. 270 A duty of confidentiality to someone with relation to the
information must exist.2 71 A generalized duty to someone with
no connection
to the information is not sufficient for insider trading law
272
apply.
to

POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1, 1 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006) (describing

the characteristics that American capitalism has come to embody); Eliezer B. Ayal & Georgios
Karras, Components of Economic Freedom and Growth: An Empirical Study, 32 J. DEVELOPING
AREAS 327, 334 (1998) (empirically linking economic freedom to participation in international
capital markets and investor confidence in financial markets).
263. See supra Part UI.
264. See infra Part [V.A.
265. See infra Part IV.B.
266. See infra Part IV.A-B.
267. See infra notes 268-81 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part II.A.
269. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4(b), 126
Stat. 291, 292.
270. See Bainbridge, Inside the Beltway, supranote 18, at 295.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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Corporate insiders have a stronger argument for being allowed to
trade on insider information than do members of Congress.273 As early
as 1966, scholars have argued that insider trading can be an effective
274 However, there is no
way of compensating top corporate executives. 27
logically similar argument that applies to members of Congress.275
Compensation arguments cannot apply to members of Congress because
they do not create the information they subsequently trade on; they
merely receive it.276 It is important to recall here that, even though there
are valid justifications for allowing corporate insider trading, these
arguments have been strongly rejected in favor of an outright ban on the
practice.277 Because the argument in favor of allowing members of
Congress to trade on inside information is even weaker and less
supported than that which would allow corporate insiders to trade on the
very same information, the regulations imposed upon legislators should
be at least as strict as those imposed upon corporate insiders. 78
The problem of the creation of an adequate duty can be remedied
by changing the duty-creating language in the Act.279 More appropriate
language would create a duty of confidentiality to the owner or
possessor of the information. 280 The following language, or some
variation thereof, would most effectively remedy this problem: "Each
member of Congress owes a duty of confidentiality to any company
whose information is given to, or presented in, Congress when such
information is derived from the person's position as a member of
Congress or gained from the performance of such member's official
responsibilities." This would create a duty for members of Congress
comparable to the duty applied to corporate insiders, and insider trading
law would thus clearly apply to members of Congress for violation of
this duty.28'

273. See MANNE, supra note 46, at 140 (arguing that insider trading can be an effective means
of compensating top executives); see also Barbabella et al., supra note 21, at 224-27 (tracing the
evolution of Manne's argument).
274. See MANNE, supra note 46, at 138.
275. See id. at 179.
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997) (highlighting the policy
reasons behind insider trading theories, including the desire to protect the integrity of the markets).
278. See Barbabella et al., supra note 21, at 234 (stating that insider trading by legislators does
not reward them for productive behavior).
279. See supra notes 264-75 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 264-75 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 652.
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B. PoliticalIntelligence Was Lobbied Out of the Bill
Regardless of whether one is offended by the philosophical
inconsistencies between established insider trading law and the STOCK
Act, the practical problem of political intelligence is just as prevalent
and causes just as many problems.282 Political intelligence is a primary
form of insider trading within the halls of Congress. 283 Not only are
hedge funds benefitting from congressional information that has not yet
been made public, but members of Congress are also indirectly
benefitting by understanding how their political knowledge translates
into market-moving information.2 84
Investors lose confidence in market integrity when it becomes
common knowledge that they are not operating freely. 285 A large reason
why corporate insiders are banned from trading on non-public
information is to protect market integrity and to ensure that all market
participants have equal access to information.28 6 If a corporate insider
possesses material non-public information, he is either required to
submit a full disclosure to the SEC before he trades in the company's
shares or refrain from trading altogether until the information has been
made. public.287 Members of Congress should be held to the same
standard when they trade or disclose legislative information to political
intelligence lobbyists.288

282. See supra Part IIIB.
283. See supra Part I.B.
284. See Zeiler, supranote 204.
285. See Laurence D. Fink, How to Restore Confidence in the FinancialMarkets, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 9, 2012, at A19 (discussing the various factors that can affect investors' confidence in the
markets).
286. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983).
287. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). The SEC adopted Regulation FD in 2000 to provide further
guidance on the disclosure problem in the corporate setting. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)
(2012); FairDisclosure,Regulation FD, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/regfd.htm (last modified Aug. 30, 2004). The regulation outlaws insider trading by
selective disclosure; if a corporate insider discloses non-public information to a select group of
individuals, he must then make a public statement (usually online) to the company's shareholders.
Id. This regulation provided much-needed guidance in a very gray and complicated area of
securities law. See, e.g., Joseph Weber, Give 'FairDisclosure' Time to Work, BUS. WK., Jan. 8,
2001, at 42, available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2001-01-07/commentary-give-fairdisclosure-time-to-work (arguing that the regulation "is designed to kill the longstanding Wall
Street practice of analysts and influential stockholders getting an inside edge ahead of other
investors").
288. See supranotes 282-87 and accompanying text.
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Concrete regulation of the political intelligence industry was
present in earlier versions of the STOCK Act. 289 The Senate version of
the 2012 Act also had a provision regulating political intelligence. 290 The
House, however, eliminated that provision in favor of the provision that
made it in the final version of the Act.291 In its hurry to enact the bill into
law, the Senate conceded to the change in this provision.292 Without this
provision, however, a large chunk of actual regulation was lost from
the legislation.293
Political intelligence is a serious problem in Washington, D.C.2 94

Any solution that will restore public confidence in both the financial and
political systems must address this problem.295 Political intelligence

firms should be required to register in a similar fashion to the process
that lobbying firms must follow. 2 96 Political intelligence firms, and the
individuals who work for them, should be required to disclose their asset
trades, their clients, and the specific activities they perform for those

clients.297 These firms and members of Congress should be held to the
standards of corporate insiders and should face similar penalties for
289, See, e.g., Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. § 6
(2011) (subjecting political intelligence activities to regulation under the Lobbying Disclosure Act);
James O'Toole, Bringing 'PoliticalIntelligence' Out of the Shadows, CNN MONEY (Feb. 17, 2012,
2:46 PM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2012/02/13/news/economy/political-intelligence/index.htm.
290. O'Toole, supranote 289.
291. Id. The text of the final version of the Act reads:
Not later than 12 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General
of the United States, in consultation with the Congressional Research Service, shall
submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate
and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the role of political intelligence in
the financial markets.
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 7(a), 126 Stat. 291,
294.
292. 158 CONG. REC. S1981 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Tom Udall); see also
What Is the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act?, PROCONORG,
http://www.insidertrading.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=004520 (last updated Apr. 4,
2012, 10:59 AM).
293. See The Stop Tradingon CongressionalKnowledge Act: Hearingon H.R. 1148 Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Rep. Sean Duffy) ("[I]f we only take
half a step, there will still be too much gray out there for members of the public to see that Members
could skirt around the new rule.").
294. See Jerke, supra note 21, at 1465-67 (reviewing the extent of Congress's advantage in the
information market).
295. Seeidat1510.
296. Cf Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006) (requiring a lobbyist to
register with both houses of Congress and to provide detailed information on all of the lobbyist's
clients).
297. Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Sen. Kirsten
Gillibrand).
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insider trading violations.298 This somewhat strict regulation is suggested
because members of Congress are in a position to receive a significant
amount of information that can have a great effect on financial
markets.2 99 In order for any trading ban to be effective, it must outright
prohibit legislators from trading in industries that they directly
impact or influence, and from interacting with lobbyists and political
intelligence gatherers in any way that would allow them to communicate
this information.3 °°
This problem can be remedied by adding a specific provision
regulating political intelligence to the Act. 30 1 The definition of political
intelligence found in the Act should remain untouched, as it adequately
describes the activities observed. 0 2 The following language, or some
version thereof, would likely remedy this problem:
For purposes of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and any
amendments thereto, the definition of 'lobbying' is hereby extended to
include political intelligence activities (as previously defined). Political
intelligence firms are subject to any and all disclosure or reporting
requirements that lobbying firms must follow. Any and all penalties
applicable to lobbying firms for violation of the law are extended to
political intelligence firms.
This would force political intelligence firms to operate outside of the
shadows and subject them to much needed oversight and regulation.30 3

298. See id at 5-6.
299. MANNE, supra note 46, at 179-80 (noting that information needed to legislate effectively
is often similar to information needed to deal in the stock market).
300. See Eggers & Hainmueller, supra note 141, at 21.
301. See supra notes 282-300 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 144-56 and accompanying text. The definition in the Act reads:
[T]he term "political intelligence" shall mean information that is(1) derived by a person from direct communications with an executive branch
employee, a Member of Congress, or an employee of Congress; and
(2) provided in exchange for financial compensation to a client who intends, and
who is known to intend, to use the information to inform investment decisions.
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 7(b), 126 Stat. 291,
295.
303. Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Sen. Kirsten
Gillibrand).
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CONCLUSION

Insider trading by members of Congress is a phenomenon that has
existed for decades and has remained largely unexposed to the general
public until recently. 3°4 A legislature that is so quick to criticize this very
behavior by corporate insiders should be held to the exact same
standards of conduct. 30 5 Allowing otherwise would permit the leaders of
our government to put themselves above the law, an idea that even the
Founders of the U.S. government could not fathom.30 6
The problem has not only existed for quite some time, but it is also
very pervasive.30 7 Quantitative evidence has demonstrated that trading
on non-public information is a common occurrence within the halls of
Congress.30 8 The American people are fully justified in demanding
change because they are being betrayed by the very people they have
trusted to run their government. 30 9 Legislators are using their
governmental positions to benefit themselves personally while, at the
same time, the average American is struggling to recover from the recent
financial crisis and its intrusions into other aspects of everyday life.310
A system that allows America's leaders to trade on valuable
information that they learn in the course of their duties in the legislature
does not conform to the idea that those who govern are not themselves
above the law. 311 The mere fact that insider trading law is considered
ambiguous in its applicability to members of Congress flies in the face
of the principles that our nation was founded upon.3 12 There must be
some legislation enacted to resolve this problem.3 13 Although it
attempted to do so, the STOCK Act is ineffective at adequately making
these corrections.3 14
The STOCK Act must either be amended or replaced so that the
issues are fairly and effectively regulated.31 5 Specifically, there are two
304.

See supra Part ll.B.

305. See Insider Trading and CongressionalAccountability: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown).
306. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison) (articulating that laws passed by the
national legislature will not be overly harsh to the nation's citizens because the legislators
themselves will be subject to the laws that they enact).
307. See supra Part II.B.
308. See supra Part .B.
309. See supraPart f.B.
310. See supra Part I.B.
311. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison).
312. Seeid.
313. See Insider Trading and CongressionalAccountability: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on
HomelandSec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown).
314. See supra Part Ill.
315. See supra Part IV.
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problems that must be addressed.3 16 First, a duty of confidentiality must
be established for members of Congress that relates to the companies
whose securities are being traded by legislators.31 7 Second, the political
intelligence industry must be brought out from the shadows and strictly
regulated.3 18 If either problem is not addressed, the American people will
continue to be placed at a disadvantage319in comparison to, and at the
hands of, their own government officials.
DanielleA. Austin*

316. See supra Part IV.
317. See supra Part [V.A.
318. See supra Part IV.B.
319. See supra Part ll.B.
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